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ABSTRACT: This paper contrasts the apophatic tradition, which has been reinvigorated by the 
post-structural emphasis upon ‘unsaying,’ with the dialogical or speech thinking tradition 
represented by the Jewish philosopher, Franz Rosenzweig, and his inimical dialogical partner, 
teacher and friend, Jewish apostate and post-Nietzchean Christian thinker, Eugen Rosenstock-
Huessy. I trace the tradition back to Hegel’s critique of the dominant metaphysical dualism of 
his age, while arguing that the key weakness in Hegel’s argument  is  his privileging of reason 
above speech, and that his contemporary J.G. Hamann’s understanding of the role speech in 
world-making had already supplied the supplement and direction that would be developed  by 
Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy. I argue that although the apophatic accentuates certain 
dimensions of our experience that are not insignificant, when those dimensions occlude the 
sociality of religious practice and narrative, reality becomes mystified, as our more mundane 
reality, which is the very reality we live and die within, is relegated to something secondary and 
relatively unimportant, in extreme cases a kind of unreality.   
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With the theological turn in social theory this last twenty years or so there has been a growing 
recognition that the constitutive ideas and representations of religion have socio-
anthropological significance. This significance cannot simply be dissolved into the philosophical 
argument about whether they are true or not. Different religious narratives lead, over time, to 
very different social and political formations. And if we want to explore the tensions and 
potential concordances of humanity, the old Enlightenment picture of religion as the alliance of 
fearful people, feverish imaginations and a manipulatively clever priest caste must be dispensed 
with. Two thinkers who advanced this position almost a hundred years ago were the Jewish 
thinker Franz Rosenzweig and his inimical dialogical partner, teacher, and friend, Jewish 
apostate, and post-Nietzchean Christian thinker, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Both considered 
themselves to be part of a new tradition in which speech and dialogue took precedence over the 
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mind’s ideas, and in which religion was irrevocably connected to world making. I trace the 
tradition back to Hegel’s critique of the dominant metaphysical dualism of his age, arguing that 
the shortcomings in his arguments need to be supplemented by his contemporary J.G. 
Hamann’s understanding of the role of speech in human world-making. I then look at how 
Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy develop speech-thinking beyond the promptings of 
Hamann and how this position draws out the short-comings of the apophatic tradition. The 
apophatic is a literary, philosophical and theological tradition which accentuates certain 
dimensions of our experience that are not insignificant. But when those dimensions occlude the 
sociality of religious practice and narrative, the reality we live and die within becomes relegated 
to something secondary and relatively unimportant.   
 
*** 
 
Of the absolutely Other we can say nothing. That sentence is the basis of the 
apophatic theological tradition. It is, as a glance at William Franke’s masterly two 
volume collection of apophatic writings from the ancients to our contemporaries 
illustrates, a long and venerable tradition.1  A great part of the venerableness of the 
apophatic tradition is due to the fact that it liberates the sacred from stale and rigid 
definitions, which imprison and reduce the sacred merely to being one other thing – 
albeit as the thing that is the source of any-thing. The apophatic, thus, serves the 
purpose of reminding us of our place in a greater scheme of things. And thus too we 
are reminded that our words share the same finitude as we ourselves; and yet we wish 
to intimate something beyond ourselves and our finitude. Or, as  Franke puts it: 
‘Language must unsay or annul itself in order to let this unsayable something, which is 
nothing, no thing at any rate, somehow register in its very evasion of all attempts to say 
it. Only the unsaying of language can “say” what cannot be said.’2 
 
Thus too, although the ‘apophatic’ can be a(n) (anti-)philosophical and aesthetic 
‘tactic’ (from Gorgias to Beckett), generally though, the apophatic tradition defers to 
and reminds us of one of the most important features of life - its mystery. While our 
ability to measure, predict and account for nature through the accruement of its laws 
1 See especially William Franke’s collections with theoretical commentary On What Cannot Be Said: 
Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts. Vol. I: Classic Formulations  and Vol. II: 
Modern and Contemporary Transformations (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). Also see Ben-Ami 
Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), Michael 
A. Sells, Mystical languages of Unsaying, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), and J. P. Williams, 
Denying Divinity: Apophasis in the Patristic Christian and Soto Zen Buddhist Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000),  and Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller Apophatic Bodies : Negative Theology, Incarnation, and 
Relationality, (Bronx, NY, USA: Fordham University Press, 2009).  
2 On What cannot be Said Vol. 1, p. 2.  
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enhances all manner of possibilities for human organization and social existence, it is 
the irruptive that is the original quality of existence we must respond to in the what 
and how of our lives. Our philosophical reflections, if they are to be of any value, must 
deal with this relationship of irruptiveness and responsiveness. We are pulled and 
pushed, formed and unformed, united and torn by life. Suffering, death, disease, 
pestilence, natural catastrophes and humanly caused cruelties and horrors – the 
panoply of evils - are as intrinsic to our experience of life as bounty and beauty. (And 
we recall that prior to philosophy, evil was not reduced to moral intentions, nor only to 
what humans had done). Narratives of a fall and God’s wrath, the disjunction between 
the self as godhead and the world of suffering as an illusion, or a decline from a golden 
age are different ways in which the fundamental disjuncture of creation and fecundity, 
and suffering, sickness, and death are dealt with. The gods are first and foremost 
mysterious, irruptive and hidden powers of life. And just as polytheistic societies are 
the social and historical preconditions of monotheistic ones, the tension between life’s 
powers forming a concordance, and the endless proliferation of powers that ‘rule’ is 
one which we see constantly repeated amongst pre-modern peoples. (Moderns who 
have lost a sense of God, if we may build on an insight from Kant’s first Critique, are 
endlessly caught up in metaphysical quandaries that stem from the fact that our 
reasoning requires specification and generalisation.) Not all peoples approach life with 
a reverence for its very presence, even if all peoples (prior to the truncated vocabulary 
that flows into modernity from the mechanistic metaphysical revolution) participated 
in life-worlds where awe-some powers, whether good or evil, friends or foes, were 
intrinsic to its very fabric. And first and foremost, a god is sacred because it is the awe 
inspiring. The disjuncture between the mundane and the sacred is based upon the 
primordial recognition of the awe-fullness of existence, and the irruptive nature of 
hidden forces which compel us to acknowledge the limitations of all that we think we 
know and have done before. The irruptive does indeed render past speech mute, at 
least momentarily, as we confront the mysterious implacability of existence being ‘that 
which defies expectation’ - whatever ‘that’ is.  
If irruptiveness is a quality that precedes our classification of life’s qualities, and if 
irruptiveness does indeed force us to rethink so that we may continue our participation 
within reality, it will be no surprise that the apophatic, though a central feature of neo-
Platonism and neo-Platonist tributaries of Christianity, Judaism and Islam, is not 
confined to one exclusive tradition. The irruptive, as that which eludes any previous 
narrative, is a constant of human experience, and thus we can find this idea spread 
across various cultures and traditions.3  
3 Thus Franke calls for an exploration of this tradition in non-Western cultures, Ibid., p. 5.  
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But just as the apophatic is evoked in recognition of the awe-inspiring Otherness of 
the sacred, it is also the case that we only know that there is an apophatic tradition 
because we speak of it. Thus Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller in their Introduction 
to Apophatic Bodies : Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality: 
Surely the paradox entailed in this traditional apophatic gesture is mind-bending 
enough— speaking as unspeaking, knowing as unknowing, darkness as light— to 
keep us occupied for all these pages. The apophatic mystics— Jewish, Christian, 
Muslim— do surely speak. They speak and unspeak volumes. With uninhibited 
kataphasis (the presumed affirmative opposite of apophasis), at once confessional 
and speculative, liturgical and philosophical, they speak about God. The more 
they speak, the more they unspeak; and yet because of the infinity of which they 
speak, it would seem they can never stop speaking.4 
Likewise, if the apophatic instructs, requests, or, even more strongly, commands that 
the encounter with the sacred is one that is so Other that silence is the only 
appropriate human response to it, it remains the fact that its Otherness is so vastly 
important that we are also compelled to speak of it.5 That speech is perhaps a speech of 
recruitment (calling for others to come and contemplate) as well as inspiration: it may 
also be a speech of parable and analogy - a confession of inadequacy, which is also a 
poetic dive into the possibilities of language to express the vast infinitude and beauty of 
the Nothing that is the awe-inspiring source of everything.  
Language laps and ebbs around the sacred as the sacred is sedimented into 
language at its most majestic and humble. From my remarks thus far, then, I hope it is 
evident that  my argument is not to deny that specific experiences are of such depth 
and solemnity, or awe, or ecstasy that they have the power to momentarily blast away 
the significance of all manner of other kinds of experiences, and thus what names we 
may call upon to express them. Nor is my argument against such experiences having a 
4 Apophatic Bodies : Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality, p. 13. 
5 Chris Boesel also addresses this in his essay in Apophatic Bodies, ‘The Apophasis of Divine Freedom: 
Saving “the Name” and the Neighbour from Human Mastery,’ which, drawing on Kierkegaard and 
Barth, is a rather orthodox, but finely argued riposte to Derriderean and post-modern aphophaticism. 
Note especially the following observation, which I fully concur with: ‘The negative gesture of the 
apophatic, then, always accompanies the necessary and appropriate kataphatic— that is, positive— 
speech to and about God, in order to preserve or ensure its faithfulness and ‘‘truthfulness’’ as creaturely 
thought and speech in relation to its divine referent— a divine referent, of course, whose infinite nature 
exceeds all such creaturely thought and talk. As such, the apophatic itself— like the kataphatic— is seen 
as a response to divine command, the command against idolatry in all its guises: the confused reduction of 
God to, and identification of God with, a particular creaturely reality of whatever form— inorganic or 
organic bodies, the bodies of words, texts, traditions, canons, the bodies of ideas, conceptual bodies— 
wherein the divine might be presumed to be grasped, limited, contained, comprehended in thought and 
speech, as an object of our knowledge, and so brought under our control and mastery,’  p. 310.  
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certain elevation, although not at the expense of other elevations. We may wish to draw 
circles around them, as it were, and point others toward their awe, as we gesture, 
perform rituals, prayers and chants, or simply enter into stillness in order to be 
reminded of, or directly encounter, a presence of such overwhelming potency and 
oceanic immensity. But surely the summoning and supplicating powers of language 
are every bit as, if not more, intrinsic to language than mere description. Further, it is 
also all too understandable that within the modalities of such solemnity, ecstasy or 
stillness, the worth of the mundanity of everyday life, not to mention the carnage and 
cruelty that have been the perennial accompaniments of social existence, not only take 
on a very different hue, but becomes the something that is really nothing in 
comparison.  
Conceding all this then, I wish to make the point in this paper that the crevice 
between the sacred as an experience of Absolute Otherness and the world of speech 
and action all too easily is accompanied by a narrative that perpetuates a 
fundamentally flawed, even potentially pernicious, metaphysical dualism. The 
perniciousness of that dualism may be readily discerned when we consider the 
dysfunctional social formations that accompany the absolute diminution of the world, 
evident in cults of death, or aspects of theocratic societies such as Tibet, or Afghanistan 
under the Taliban. And if we come closer to home culturally, we cannot but help be 
struck by the ferocity with which early Humanists within the Church (from Dante to 
Erasmus) and Reformers attacked the hellish overflows of theocratic overreach. This is 
not to deny that the Reformers opened up new hells – for their path does lead to 
nationalism and thus is one major component of what becomes the 20th century. And 
what was lost in the Reformation has been powerfully addressed by Catholic apologists 
such as Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, who repeatedly emphasized that the 
Catholic Church was a mosaic of various social types, an attempt to gather and 
balance a variety of human possibilities and not a mystical or puritan block of 
conformity (thereby they remind us of the conformist nature of so much of modernity). 
But it is to acknowledge that the Reformers’ reaction against Otherworldliness was 
allied to their insistence that God’s presence must be found in the world again, and 
that men and women should enter into families and adopt professions so that God’s 
work be done by the faithful.  
It was his appreciation of the importance of this feature of the Reformation (and 
thus why he would call himself a Lutheran)6 that was the social component of Hegel’s 
relentless attack upon metaphysical dualism. When reading or discussing Hegel it is 
6 For Hegel’s numerous references to himself as a Lutheran see Phillip Merklinger Philosophy, Theology, and 
Hegel’s Berlin Philosophy of Religion, 1821-1827, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 99-100 
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always necessary to distinguish what is brilliant and true and what is all too easily 
ridiculed and dismissed (and the hubris which is at its base) – which is what he himself 
was most proud of and which sustained his critique of metaphysical dualism – viz., his 
systemicity. Hegel, we recall, was nourished on Fichte and Schelling and cut his 
philosophical teeth by an analytic comparison of them (The Difference between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy of 1801) and, in his next work, Faith and Knowledge (1803), he 
advanced his case by drawing upon a further comparison of Fichte with Kant and 
Jacobi. He had accepted the Fichtean critique of Kant – that the transcendental 
elements were dependent upon an underlying unity which Kant had not adequately 
treated in his concept of transcendental apperception.  Hegel had then accepted that 
Schelling had been correct to criticize Fichte’s philosophy for failing to account for the 
necessity of what he called a ‘point of indifference’ which would explain the 
relationship between nature and the ‘I.’ Again, as all familiar with Hegel’s 
development know, what then led Hegel to depart from Schelling was, as he made all 
too evident in a polemical aside in the Phenomenology was the poetic leap into the 
Absolute that Schelling had taught in his System of Transcendental Idealism. If we pause for 
a moment on why Hegel took up arms against Fichte and Schelling the power of his 
move (if not its completion) retains its philosophical significance.  
 The various modes of what, in Faith and Knowledge, he called the ‘Subjective 
Principle’ or ‘Principle of the North’ was that they provided reasons for what they 
ended up saying was not attainable by reason, and that in this respect they were 
presiding over a way of understanding that bifurcated the world and our relationship 
within it. For Hegel, this abstract understanding blinds us to the greater truth that we 
do not encounter a blank x (a ‘thing in itself’) of the world, but a world ‘full of’ 
conceptual labour. As soon as we ascribe a predicate to the ‘world’ or any of its most 
elemental objects, say a ‘rose’ or a ‘leaf of grass’, we defer to a world of accumulated 
(i.e. historical) knowledge and experience – and this, for Hegel, is exactly what the 
sciences are. In other words, for Hegel, as soon as we want to do more than gesture to 
anything immediately ‘there’, i.e. as soon as we speak about reality, we enter into the 
‘labour of the concept’, which cannot be severed from the systemic and logically 
dynamic elements which provide the unity that enables us to have ideas. (Had Kant 
not originally shifted philosophical attention to the formative elements and role of 
cognition, Hegel would not have been possible.) Reason is thus not simply, as Kant 
had argued, the capacity to make inferences from our understanding, but rather the 
perpetually active and dialectically immanent process in which we and the world share 
an identity. But, for Hegel, we fail to appreciate the identity we have with our world, 
particularly our social worlds, i.e. the world where the fruits of Reason are, after our 
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most pressing spiritual creations of religion, art and philosophy, most palpable. That is, 
in looking in our human worlds we see ourselves even more transparently than in 
looking at nature as such. But this makes us more prone to take disastrous flights into 
fancy to try and overcomes the challenges and obstacles we are confronted with as we 
seek to expand our freedom – which, for Hegel, is the same as making the world ever 
more conform to Reason as the Absolute Idea.  
For Hegel, the modern self was a divided and unhappy consciousness because it 
was not conscious of its own freedom, and thus of its own relationship between 
actuality and possibility. (This is why the more radical readings of Hegel such as found 
in Marcuse, or, more recently Žižek, miss the balance between conserving the past and 
moving into the future that is intrinsic to Hegel’s view of politics.) As Hegel would 
elaborate upon in the Phenomenology, the bifurcation of modern consciousness was 
ubiquitous in the various metaphysical systems, defended by his contemporaries, 
which always smuggled in some Jenseits, some beyond, impenetrable to reason, but, 
mysteriously, accessible through faith, or art, or intellectual intuition.  
For Hegel, genuine philosophical reasoning had to account for the continuity of 
the process in which a particular term is identified as essential to a metaphysical 
system, even if its presence is invoked as an element outside the system. That is to say, 
Hegel simply (and brilliantly) raised the question – how can something be outside of a 
system when its presence is essential to the system’s existence? The element ostensibly 
beyond is, in other words, and from the point of view of what we know, fully 
continuous or commensurate in nature with what has preceded it. Whether it be known 
or rationalized as intuition, faith, or art, it is, says Hegel, not some thing or process 
existing outside of reason, but one very much within it. The philosophical error 
consists in not adequately reasoning about what is really happening.  
  If, as critics of Hegel from Schelling to Kierkegaard to Marx, to Rosenzweig, 
Cassirer and Croce to Levinas and Deleuze (just to take some of his critics) have held, 
Hegel’s attempts are grotesque if not outright comical at times (everyone’s favourite 
exhibit being The Philosophy of Nature), his insight on this matter was, nevertheless, true. 
And one may make a similar case about Hegel’s social and political thought, which his 
critics, unsurprisingly, see as equally repellant. Indeed Hegel’s approach to society is 
most deliberately, as the laborious scaffold of The Philosophy of Right unambiguously 
demonstrates, one in which the problem of diremption must be solved. Thus no 
component of the social and political system is addressed by Hegel until he 
demonstrates its dialectical or logical genesis. To be sure (as no end of post Second 
World War Hegel commentators have rightly argued),  the solution is not totalitarian, 
and his Rechtsstaat bears features of a constitutional monarchy, which is also proto- 
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liberal–corporatist. Hegel’s view of the state was, as Eric Weil argued convincingly in 
his Hegel and the State, deeply indebted to a somewhat idealized version of liberal 
Prussia.7 Its antecedents have more to do with the Italian republics and their 
independence, and the freedom of citizens to be subject to laws they themselves have 
made, than with what Prussia came to exemplify after Bismarck’s particular 
reconfiguration of the Prussian militaristic state for Germany’s national consolidation 
and imperial expansion.8  
The problem of diremption, of the divided unhappy selves, of selves who (to take 
up Hegel’s critique of Kant and Fichte) give themselves moral laws they ever strive to 
attain but simply can’t live by, is a nightmarish one. For Hegel, it is the utopian basis 
for terror; the judgment of the actual by a literal nothing, a form which only happens 
to have a content at all by smuggling in features of the ethical life which become 
diminished and truncated so they may be squeezed into the overly formalized moral 
conscience of its bearer. Let us concede two major weaknesses in Hegel’s thinking: 
first, that he ends up in another phantasmagoric labyrinth when he tries to speak from 
the vantage point of the Absolute, and second, as Franz Rosenzweig relentlessly 
argued in his devastating two volume work Hegel und der Staat, Hegel failed to 
understand the greatest political problem of the 19th century leading up to the Great 
War - the problems of empire and nations. But he was not wrong to argue that 
modern men and women were deeply alienated from the world in which they lived. 
And the alienation extended to the very thoughts they had about it which found their 
expression even within the great philosophical works of the age. And yet again – we 
concede that Hegel’s divinization of the state (which, contrary to Walter Kaufmann, is 
undeniably what he does, and why his political theory goes awry in the manner 
identified by Rosenzweig)9 is a disastrous move – which, nevertheless certainly says 
7 Eric Weil Hegel and the State, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1998).  However, one should not exaggerate Hegel’s liberalism either. To the liberal Rudolf Haym, Hegel 
was nowhere near liberal enough. See his Hegel und seine Zeit, (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1857). But Haym’s 
political environment had little in common with Hegel’s – by 1848 Prussian troops had fired upon 
Berliners wanting their freedom. See Peter H. Wilson’s brief but helpful essay, ‘The Origins of Prussian 
Militarism’, in History Today, Volume: 51 Issue: 5 2001, online at http://www.historytoday.com/peter-h-
wilson/origins-prussian-militarism last viewed 28.10. 2013.  
8 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for Cosmos and History for suggesting I make this point of 
clarification. 
9 Walter Kaufmann’s ‘Introduction’ to Debating the Political Philosophy of Hegel, (New Jersey: Transaction, 
2010) has a section entitled ‘The March of God and Other Boners’ pp. 3-6 Also see his chapter 10, ‘The 
Hegel Myth and its Method.’ Kaufmann, in a manner reminiscent of what he does with his numerous 
writings and footnotes in his translations on Nietzsche, is ever on the look-out to make Hegel more 
palatable to his contemporaries. But while he saves Hegel from totalitarianism, and rightly points out that 
‘The state is the march of God through the world’ injects totalitarian associations not in the German, he 
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something real/ actual/ true (to use his alignments) about the ‘self-consciousness’ of 
the modern state as the court of final appeal in, again to use Hegel’s terminology, ‘the 
ethical sphere.’ But, more importantly, if we look to his chastisement of Jakob 
Friedrich Fries’s romanticization of the German ‘student movement’  or  his critique of 
Haller for an excessive romantic approach to law in the Philosophy of Right, or his 
critique of Fichte’s Closed Commercial State in his Essay on Natural Right, or, most 
powerfully, his critique of the ‘logic’ of the Terror in the Phenomenology, we can see that 
his attunement to the perils of utopian and Romantic flights into the Absolute stood in 
the closest relationship to his recognition of how the underpinning metaphysic of the 
negative socio-theology, the aphophatic, within the social, contains perils that cannot 
be ignored.  
For all of Hegel’s diagnostic brilliance, I think the deep flaw within the philosophy 
came not so much from his recognition that the absolutization of the beyond, and thus 
what we may say about it, was but one more symptom of the alienation he sought to 
overcome, but that his move involved one capital error, the first part of which his 
critics have all identified. He made too much of reason and logic and its relationship to 
action. But he also made too little of the relationship between speech and action. The 
corollary of his relative failure to address speech, and what is also the cause of that 
failure, is the ‘excessive’ role that he gives to the mind, a product stemming from his 
belief that he had to account for the problem that led to Kant’s transcendental 
idealism (the problem of synthetic judgments a priori, which Hegel will demonstrate in 
the Science of Logic and Logic is due to an assumed dualism that is itself the problem).  
Interestingly, it was a contemporary of Kant’s, Johann Georg Hamann, who was 
the thinker of that age who took speech most seriously and would thereby become one 
of the seminal figures of what Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy called 
‘new thinking’ or ‘speech thinking.’10  Hegel was fascinated by Hamann and he would 
write a lengthy essay on Hamann. To be sure, he could not consider Hamann a 
fails to reflect upon what Hegel means by arguing that the state is providential (something he acknowledges 
Hegel as saying) and that it has become an authority without peer (i.e. God) in the modern world. 
Kaufmann has no idea that there may be a problem about the modern state that has nothing specifically 
to do with Hegel, but much to do with the scope of its reign. I am thinking here of Marcuse and Adorno, 
who for all their left Hegelianism, are, in my view, correct to see processes within the modern state as 
tending toward a total administrative state. Such a state poses a real contradiction to Hegel’s view of 
freedom as reconciliation. Overall when compared with Rosenzweig’s reading of Hegel in his Hegel und der 
Staat (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1920) the readings of Hegel from the 1940s through to the 1970s in the Anglo-
American world tend to be played out against a polarity of state and individual which de-historicizes The 
Philosophy of Right.  
10 See Hegel on Hamann (Evanston: Northwestern University, 2008), translated, edited, and introduced by 
Lisa Marie Anderson. 
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philosopher, and his assessment is frequently caustic. The fact, though, that he failed 
to pick up on Hamann’s most important philosophical claim about language taking 
priority over reason is, I think, indicative of how immersed Hegel was in the paradigm 
he had inherited from Kant. For it was how Hamann viewed language that took him 
in a direction so alien to how Hegel was setting out the problem of the age. Hegel 
might well be forgiven for this oversight; for anyone familiar with Hamann knows that 
he frequently speaks in tongues so opaque, elliptical and mysterious that one could 
easily place him in the aphophatic tradition. Wisely, though, Franke does not include 
Hamann amongst his tradition. The philosophical innovation was raised against Kant 
in his very brief review of the Critique of Pure Reason, Metacritique of the Purism of Reason.11 
It makes but one simple, albeit all important point –that Kant’s transcendental 
idealism is essentially a formalistic exercise which neglects how language is the root of 
reason.  
It is worth briefly pausing upon this point and noting why it is worth taking 
seriously, and why it has not been. First, the entire problematic of Kant proceeds as if 
language did not matter – and in this Kant remains firmly in the naturalistic paradigm 
which Descartes establishes. His cognitive vocabulary and problems he sets to solve 
about mind and reality all come back to the metaphysical dualism laid out in 
Descartes’ philosophical writings. What matters, for Kant, is that we can explain the 
relationship between phenomena, that is, the world of experience, and the apodictic 
system of mathematics. Because of the ‘fit’ between what could not possibly be 
(demonstrated to be) apodictic (phenomena), and what simply could not be anything 
other than apodictic (mathematics) Kant has to explain how this ‘fit’, which is required 
in the science of (Newtonian) physics, is possible. The fit between mathematical 
experimental models and phenomena is plain enough for all to see in the efficacy of 
Newtonian physics. This simply cannot be explained if we repeat Hume’s mistake, and 
take the concept of cause as akin to other concepts that we attain through experience 
(and this holds for all the concepts of understanding and, what Kant calls, the forms of 
intuition, which supply the principle of the Newtonian framework). More bluntly, 
Hume did not grasp the distinction between the form or lawfulness of experience and 
the content that was the actual experience.  
Stated thus, it is easy to see that language has no real role in any of this – it is a 
highly technical problem that takes place within a framework, and it is an attempt to 
make sense of a specific modality of human experience and knowledge (one which 
11 Ronald Gregory Smith J. G. Hamann: A Study in Christian Existentialism: An Introduction to the Thought of the 
Great Eighteenth Century Thinker with Selections from His Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 207-
222. 
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Kant uses as the basis of all knowledge, until he realizes this does not help explain 
what goes on in the biological sciences). Of course, as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all 
argued this begs the problem of a plethora of other conditions which make thought 
possible and this also isolates what is happening in the natural world from the 
historical world; thus Hegel’s critique of Kant is reminiscent of Vico’s critique of 
Descartes. And it was this kind of isolation that the post-Kantian idealistic tradition 
could not countenance (just as Husserl could not countenance it). But even prior to this 
realization, it was Fichte’s insistence upon thinking about the thinking being, factored 
into the philosophical problematic, that was the move that bought the edifice down. 
But even if we leave this point aside there was something also evident from the first 
that, for all its genius, (and again Hegel would expose this with typical forthrightness) 
the entire problematic of the Critique and its solution had to be cast in terms of a 
facultative logic (taken from Descartes’s appropriation from the scholastics).  Fichte 
and Hegel demanded legitimation of Kant’s entire problematic, insisting he answer 
why he simply thought he could take elements ready to hand in the formation of the 
mathematical and empirical sciences as philosophical proof of anything. We recall that 
Kant’s cognitive elements and their interaction include intuition (inner and outer), 
concepts (pure and empirical), imagination, reason, judgment, and various other 
operations which start to seem like an endless supply of rabbits stored in the 
philosopher’s/magician’s top hat. In other words, the more that was required of this 
facultative logic to illustrate precisely what the mind contributed to the larger question 
Kant had set himself about Reason - and the more Kant thought about the a priori 
contributions of cognition the more he saw - the less convincing it was as the solution 
to the original intention of establishing, once and for all, a scientific metaphysics. The 
constructive mathematical theory he had come up with did little more than provide a 
neat answer to the number line and thus the appropriateness of analytical geometry 
for the marshalling of experience into laws was as problematic as it was dazzling - 
albeit none of the successors were overly dazzled by it. And even in the second half of 
the 19th century when Hegel was, as Marx and Engels protested, being treated as a 
‘dead dog,’12 and the neo-Kantians, most brilliantly in the work of Herman Cohen, 
resurrected Kant, advances in mathematics were making this all too dubious to make 
the critical philosophy the solution Kant had claimed it to be. To sum up, Kant had 
set himself a problem that had evolved on the back of the metaphysical 
12 This mutual ire by Engels and Marx about Hegel’s mistreatment (see letter to Engels January 11, 1968; 
Marx to Ludwig Kugelman, June 27 1870) would find itself articulated by Marx in the ‘Afterword’ of 
Volume 1 of Capital - http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm   The letters can be 
found at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_01_11.htm and 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70_06_27.htm All last viewed 28.10.2013. 
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accompaniment to the scientific revolution. The actual evolution of the problem did 
not concern Kant in the slightest. He focused solely on the philosophical problematic, 
including the core metaphysical antitheses generated within science, and ethics, and 
the transcendental conundrums of aesthetics (the traditional philosophical triumvirate 
of the true, the good and the beautiful) and the spill-over from these antitheses such as 
the meaning of freedom in history. Moreover, although he did not put it this way, he 
had adopted the cognitive language of the mind (including that of logic as well as the 
facultative language that was largely indistinguishable from what was then considered 
to be ‘psychology’) as well as the mathematical and ‘natural’ philosophical language 
that had evolved. It was the recognition of the genetic interplay of the various elements 
of the evolution of the sciences that, inter alia, united Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. But it 
was Hamann, before any of them who had noticed this, who saw that language was 
the constant within the problem and that the relationship between language and reality 
itself is never addressed by Kant. Of course, saying this does not contribute to solving 
the problem Kant had set himself; rather it displaces it as a real problem capable of 
having a solution. But (and here is an important overlap between Hamann and Hegel) 
once the world is seen as only knowable at all through the resources with which we 
with engage it, then the very dualism at the basis of Kant’s philosophy (and it is a 
dualism, again as Hegel never ceased to emphasize) continuously dictates the moves of 
the entire system. Kant’s Preface to Critique of Judgment reveals that he only realized 
that he should deal with art and teleology because he could not explain the 
relationship between freedom and necessity, a most telling remark about how the 
system was generating problems, and thus a key moment in the formation of the new 
idealism of Fichte etc. Thus, the question of whether the problem Kant had set himself 
was even a genuine problem, already assumes a metaphysical commitment.  
Hamann was not primarily interested in taking his view of humanity from the 
natural sciences, let alone from the metaphysical turn inaugurated by Descartes, which 
makes the reductive approach of mathematical and experimental ‘modelling’ the 
yardstick of all real knowledge. He was interested in our symbolic nature, and in the 
role of speech in that symbolism. Of course, that does not mean that he could answer 
Kant’s problem, anymore than Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language games’ answers it. 
But it is evident that Kant’s answer is so flawed that for all its symmetry, it is 
unsustainable. What, though, Hamann awakens us to is that while the naturalistic 
metaphysics of modernity start with the formulation that the book of nature is written 
in mathematics, it is the relationship between speech and reality, and the different 
kinds of languages and powers stored in language, the symbolic ‘keys’ so to speak, that 
are required for the disclosure of different dimensions or aspects of reality. And this 
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means realizing that language is not something outside of reality or laminated over it, 
but as much within it as material or biological ‘things.’    
Everything Hamann says about language flows from this – and it is not surprising 
that with the linguistic turn in the 20th century that Hamann has (albeit slowly) 
acquired relevance. Moreover, we have entered into a Post-Secular Age – and this is 
not only evident from the fact that well educated peoples from all manner of faiths, 
aware of Enlightenment narratives, strictures and legacies, choose to find their 
orientation within a symbolic world that does not fit into the Enlightened enclaves of 
human possibility. Thus, too, philosophy has become ever attuned to how this is 
possible and thus Hamann no longer can be dismissed, as he was by Kant, as a 
Schwärmer, an irrationalist drunk on the feasts of the unbridled imagination (Kant was 
bewildered by how so much intelligence could be put to such poor use). But, with the 
disintegration of metaphysical naturalism, we are able to hear such sentences as the 
following with a freshness and relevance Kant did not seem to fathom: ‘every 
phenomenon of nature was a word – the sign, symbol, and pledge of a new mysterious, 
inexpressible, but all the more intimate union, community of participation of divine 
energies and ideas.’ And as Gwen Griffith Dickinson, who cites the afore sentence, 
continues, for Hamann, ‘every word is this pledge of divine and human 
interrelatedness; ultimately we are told “God was the word.” Because God is the word, 
and this word lives in our mouth and heart, God lives in our mouth and heart.’13 
Speech, if understood thus, is not primarily descriptive, but creative and redemptive. 
And it is this legacy of Hamann’s that would be taken up by Franz Rosenzweig, 
Ferdinand Ebner, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Hans and Rudolph Ehrenberg and the 
other ‘speech thinkers’ who emerged in the catastrophe of the First World War.14 They 
too insisted that speech not only is the means of transference of the species across the 
ages, of translation and thus communion between peoples, it is the basis of world and 
self-making; it engenders the unprecedented.  
Also significantly, unlike say the late Wittgenstein, who would also pit language 
games against reductive accounts of mind and nature which dominated (and still do 
dominate) Anglo-American Analytic Philosophy,15 the preoccupation with language 
was also mounted in the context of (a post-Nietzschean) revival of the role of faith in 
13 Gwenn Griffith Dickson, Johann George Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1995), p. 233.  
14 See Harold Stahmer’s ‘Speak That I May see Thee’: The Religious Significance of Language, (New York: 
MacMillan, 1968).  
15 Of course, the famous conclusion of the Tractatus was Wittgenstein’s apophatic moment, and while he 
had an interest in religious thinkers, his ‘philosophy’ does not disclose the sense of religion as the group 
designated by Rosenzweig as ‘new thinkers.’  
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world making. Again this connection between language and world making was 
something that Hamann and his friend and intellectual sparring partner (also astute to 
the fecundity of language), Friedrich Jacobi would emphasize.16 We have mentioned 
how Hegel was driven crazy by the manner in which faith was circulating in the 
various systems and discourses of his contemporaries – and that was why he saw 
characters as diverse as Schleiermacher and Fries and Schelling as largely of a piece. 
But while he was attuned to the underlying philosophical pattern of his time, his 
philosophy completely missed the ‘existential’ currents that would bind (completely 
unconsciously) Kierkegaard (who, of course, found a precursor in Hamann, and 
attended Schelling’s lectures which bored him, but which did articulate a similar 
existential critique of Hegel to Kierkegaard himself), Schopenhauer (Hegel’s younger 
contemporary nemesis) and Nietzsche; in different ways they would all leave 
pretensions of the Hegelian sort to system in ruins. Moreover, if, as I have suggested, 
Hegel was quite brilliant in his attack upon faith trumping knowledge, there was 
another way in which faith could be read. Hegel himself came closest to considering 
this alternative in his lectures of the Philosophy of Religion, where he sought to convey the 
genuine spiritedness of religion and its forms, a spiritedness, which nevertheless, he 
saw as being most fully articulated philosophically. In this respect, the ‘speech thinkers’ 
referred to above departed significantly from Hegel precisely because they thought he 
had missed the depth and significance of ritual which binds unconsciously in ways more 
effective than what can be achieved via conscious conceptual expression. But, from the 
perspective of these later thinkers, Hegel was simply too steeped in, and thus reacting 
to the Protestant idea of Glauben (and the German Glauben covers both faith and belief) 
as ‘belief’ or ‘faith’ in a Jenseits to really see the world making potency of religion. And 
anyone familiar with Hegel’s Philosophy of History can see that for all its nods to 
Christianity in an abstract/ conceptual sense how threadbare it is in its understanding 
and discussion of the Church, not to mention other faiths, in history. Bluntly, as far as 
Hegel’s lectures on history go, the Church, with its various synods, councils, doctrinal 
disputes may just as well not have existed between Jesus and Luther. Hegel saw history 
as essentially a philosophical answer to a philosophical problem. Accordingly, Hegel 
remained like a fly stuck to the fly-paper of the philosophical problematic he was 
16 Hamann basically thought Jacobi was too steeped in the arid God of the Enlightenment to really 
appreciate the significance of the biblical God. For Hamann’s critique of Jacobi see George di Giovanni’s 
“Introduction” to his Friedrich Jacobi: The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel All Will, translated and 
introduction etc. by George di Giovanni, (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1994), pp. 86 ff. 
See Hamann’s letters to Jacobi in Ronald Gregory Smith, J. G. Hamann: A Study in Christian Existentialism, 
pp. 246-260. 
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reacting to. And thus he did not really deal with the fact that in much of the Christian 
(and Jewish) tradition Glauben does not so much mean faith as ‘belief’ opposed to 
knowledge, but trust in the way of world making that proceeds through veneration of 
the name and powers of life that this name summons up, or attunes us to. 
If Hegel had remained captive to the matrix or paradigm he was reacting to and 
thus missed other philosophical currents, the same was no doubt true of Kant who had 
missed the undercurrents that were raising the most serious criticisms of the faith in 
Reason that held the very disparate members of the Enlightenment together. And if 
we momentarily deploy the binary of faith and reason, the Enlightenment was an age 
erected on that very faith (and if by Enlightenment we take its naturalistic assumptions 
about knowledge into account, then this is consistent with Hegel’s larger criticism of 
faith).17 Now Kant, who in so many ways is the apogee of Enlightenment philosophy 
himself, had, of course, understood that Enlightenment was built on faith. Thus his 
famous remark in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason that knowledge must be 
denied to make way for faith.18 For only thus could we recognize the possibility of 
freedom as active in the world. But it was more provocatively put by Friedrich Jacobi, 
who would (re)interpret David Hume’s skepticism as the concession that faith was the 
ontological condition of any knowledge19 – a statement far stronger than Kant’s, but it 
was a statement which we can see adumbrates the subsequent trials of Reason as it 
becomes not only the province of science and morality and art (Kant’s great attempt to 
map out the cognitive ground and spheres of its presence) but ever more fragmented 
through the emergence of hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism and beyond. 
The fragmentation of Reason coincides with the realization of speech thinkers (a 
realization independent of, but not unrelated to anthropologists who had become 
immersed in the life-worlds of their studies) that faith was an intrinsic component of 
the life-world of a people, and hence of its identity. Of course, the Romantic critics of 
the Enlightenment had already intimated this, but an important step had been taken 
when it was not only seen that a people is constituted by its narratives, but that 
narratives themselves are vital: words become flesh. A people were not mute objects to 
be put under the scientific microscope but living creatures working on their world and 
themselves – not mere subjects either, but inter-relational responsive creatures. The 
17 See my ‘Hegel on Kant, Fichte, Jacobi: Being Reasonable about Faith and Knowledge’ in From Faith in 
Reason to Reason in Faith: Transformations in Philosophical Theology from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, 
edited by Wayne Cristaudo and Heung-wah Wong (Lanham: University Press of America, 2012). 
18 Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx. 
19 Friedrich Jacobi, David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism, a Dialogue (1787), in Friedrich Jacobi: 
The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel All Will, pp. 253-378. 
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step is not only an advance upon a restricted view of knowledge, but it is also an 
identification with a most archaic understanding of speech and ritual as powers.  
Perhaps the most brilliant philosophical exposition to not only arrive at this 
conclusion, but to use it as the basis of a new philosophical anthropology was Franz 
Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption, all too often, especially today in North American 
readings, mistaken as an exercise in ethics. The Star’s focus is primarily that of the 
meaning of Jewish and Christian peoples – but it makes its case by an extremely dense, 
and rich, though extremely schematic, comparative theo-anthropological appraisal of 
these two ways of world making with the foundations of ancient, Eastern, and Islamic 
peoples.20 By exaggerating the importance of the role Rosenzweig ascribes to silence, 
Rosenzweig may be, and has been, included within the apophatic tradition,21 but The 
Star’s fundamental innovation is in how it tracks the different threads of world weaving 
and how they are spun out of contrary understandings of what is held sacred - the 
venerations, appeals and names which constitute the historical ‘solidifications’ and 
‘seals’ of a people. Rosenzweig saw that many of the social and cultural variegations of 
peoples come back to which ‘God’ they worship; a people’s God(s) represent the 
disparate what’s and how’s of what it is searching for from reality. The gods are 
symptoms and signs of different pangs of orientation. This world-weaving is as much 
true of the cross-cultural kinds or types who respond to the sacred as it is to the nations 
or peoples – for nations are, inter alia, collectives which are distinguished by the 
constellations of their designated types and modes of actions, the cluster of social roles 
and tolerated possibilities (possibly allowing for the genesis of new types).  
Rosenzweig also argued in the Star that philosophy had to resort to theology to 
make sense of a domain of experience for which it simply lacked the language. Those 
are the dimensions of experience where something not only comes out of nothing 
(creation) but on account of which peoples (specifically the Jewish, Christian, and, for 
him, more problematically, Muslims) have been compelled to speak of a creator in 
20 Far less well known, and a work a team of us are presently translating, is the two volume Sociologie by 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (now reissued in a new German edition as a three volume work) Im Kreuz der 
Wirklichkeit: Eine nach-goethische Soziologie , 3 vols., Mit einem Vorwort von Irene Scherer und einem 
Nachwort von Michael Gormann-Thelen, new edition of Soziologie by Michael Gormann-Thelen, Ruth 
Mautner, and Lise van der Molen, (Tübingen:Talheimer, 2009). The second (and, in the new edition, also 
the third) volume, which can be translated as In the Full Count of the Times, is also a brilliant exploration of 
the distinct socio-theo- anthropological features of tribes, empires, the Greek city states, and the Israelites, 
and the re-constitution of those formations after Christendom first takes hold of the Roman Empire and 
then forms the basis of Europe and its subsequent messianic revolutions and global flow-ons.  
21 Thus Franke dedicates a chapter to Rosenzweig’s Star in Volume 2 of On What Cannot be Said. I am a 
great admirer of Franke’s thoughtful, careful, and finely crafted scholarship, and my disagreement with 
him here is over relative weightings of where the unsayable fits into life for Rosenzweig– not about 
whether it is important per se.  
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order to actively participate with creation as composed of living creatures conscious of 
their historicity and fragility. For Rosenzweig, Jews and Christians had become 
conscious of a divine ‘revelation,’ first given voice in the Song of Songs, that love is as 
strong as death. This in turn stood in the closest relationship to the task assigned these 
peoples by their God: not only to participate in creation but to be co-redeemers of 
creation. Jews and Christians are thus seen as participants in the what and how of 
what survives death because of the strength of their love - their love dictates their role 
in ‘eternity.’ Eternity is not to be interpreted in a neo-Platonic or mystical sense, but in 
the perpetuity of time. In Speech and Reality this redemptive dimension of human 
existence is articulated by Rosenstock-Huessy thus: ‘it is we who decide what belongs 
to the past and what shall be part of the future.’22 
From this perspective, the theological is itself an anthropological discourse – and 
thus to know a person or a people we need to know what they sacrifice themselves for, 
know what they hold sacred, what they look toward in order to organize themselves 
for today and tomorrow. That is to say who or what we worship is a key to who or 
what we are. And that originary act of worship seeps its way deep into cultures. Thus 
for example, just as the Calvinist content of the founders of the United States has 
diminished in social efficacy, its Calvinist form is as manifestly conspicuous in its 
economy, politics, popular culture and other sites of reflexivity, the origins of Islam 
cling tenaciously to the Middle East. Thus, from this perspective, the theo-
anthropological roots of world making tend to be occluded in narratives where the 
oceanic silence of the sacred reduces historical experience to mere Maya (or any other 
such modality in which the intense experiences of beatitude/nirvana etc. blasts away 
the significance of the ostensibly more fragile and fleeting actions done in time). Thus 
in contrast to the apophatic, Rosenzweig’s conception of the sacred does not relegate 
speech to something fundamentally inadequate when compared to what is most 
important. Rather, the God who creates and redeems the world is a God of action and 
a God who does his work through speech, whose love is spread by our lips. 
Rosenstock-Huessy will capture this power of God in his book The Fruit of Our Lips.23 
Thus do action speech and love stand in a vital relationship not only to each other, 
but also to enhancing the sacredness of creation itself. In the latter case, the 
lovableness of life is not only preserved, and protected but also furthered through 
speech and action. Further, in this case, our task on earth is not simply to contemplate 
22 Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and Reality (Norwich, VT.: Argo, 1970), 19. 
23 Raymond Huessy, Rosenstock-Huessy’s grand-son, is presently doing a new English edition of this work 
which has appeared in German as Die Furcht der Lippen in Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts, Vol. 2, (Lambert 
Schneider: Heidelberg, 1964),  and in English as The Fruit of Lips, or, Why Four Gospels? ed. Marion 
Davis Battles, (Pittsburgh, Pa.: The Pickwick Press, 1978). 
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the sacred source, the creative ground of existence, the mystery of God, but, one may 
say, to make the world more ‘Goded’ than it would be, but for our action and 
participation with the divine. Note too, speech is not the antithesis of action, but a 
moment within the formation of action; speech recruits and requests, commands etc. I 
have used the word speech here in a special way, a way which is central to Rosenzweig 
and which Rosenstock-Huessy would provide an elaborate defence of in his Sociology 
(sections which deal with this have appeared in English in The Origins of Speech)24 as not 
to be confused with mere babble or informal routinized chat – but with speech that is 
commanding, world forming. The concern is with speech as a power that transforms. 
Speech that must be listened to ‘Audi, ne moriamur. Listen, lest we die; or: listen and we 
shall survive.’25 If this sounds melodramatic, that is because as philosophers we are 
generally accustomed to taking the things back into the study, as if the study were the 
adequate arena of thinking, whereas speech thinking generally takes events as the 
furnace of speech.  
The most elemental grammatical feature of speech is the same as the most 
elemental feature of thought, the name, which through circulation enables 
communion. Since Plato it is also the name that has invariably been raced past so that 
philosophers could get to ideas or concepts and reasons. Because Hamann emphasized 
the name and the living word, not the concept or idea, he was not seen for what he 
was by Kant and Hegel, for whom the concept and idea [in Kant let us add intuition] 
takes priority over the name. An important feature of the name is its historicity, a 
historicity that is a circulatory process and not just the result of a reflective one, but 
one that people respond to or pass over on the basis of their experiences. Moreover, it 
is primarily through a people’s loves (its triumphs and concordances) and its 
catastrophes, traumas and hates (its wars and revolutions) that the names that most 
matter, that we most draw upon in our appeals and commands, the names that become 
deeply woven into our institutions and social memory and that are passed on between 
generations, are formed.  
If then we see speech in this manner we see it is not at all a ‘tool’ which we try to 
attach to an experience, as if it were a label which we put on objects which the foolish 
need to be reminded are not the objects themselves.26 Names are as little labels as 
experiences are objects. Speech - vital speech - forms experience because it is part of 
the calling and response of creation and the world.  
24 The Origins of Speech, introduced by Harold Stahmer, (Norwich, Vt.: Argo, 1981).  
25 Speech and Reality, 22. 
26 This is a recurrent theme in Rosenstock-Huessy, see especially ‘”Es Regnet” Oder Die Sprache steht 
auf der Kopf’ in Volume 1, Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts, pp. 35-85.   
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To return to my opening salvo about the apophatic: one reason that the apophatic 
has become such an issue within philosophy again today can, I think, be gauged by 
what writers such as Bataille and Derrida, indeed the poststructuralist tradition 
generally, thinks about tradition and language, and the animosity towards any kind of 
essentialism and the call to new taxonomies and new possibilities (also recall Foucault’s 
use of Borges in The Order of Things or Deleuze’s tactic of de-territorialization). These 
reactions are also part of the entire anti-Cartesian thrust that mobilized the 
movements of Dadaism and surrealism. It is a response to a tradition experienced as 
tyrannical – it is, though, as I also noted in an earlier footnote of Chris Boesel’s, a 
response within and by language. Curiously, the apophatic gesture taken by 
deconstructionists and post-structuralists within the linguistic turn, by reproducing the 
Saussurian dualism so conspicuous in the systemic significance of langue and parole, 
signifier and signified, fails to completely reformulate the philosophical terrain in the 
manner of Hamann, Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy and speech-thinkers. They 
are caught up in the binary of unsaying and saying precisely because of an implicit and 
irrevocable alterity that clings to the philosophical binaries that it deploys in order to 
refute them.  Not surprisingly this suggests (much as Hegel would argue against Fichte 
and the younger Schelling who had also wanted to expunge the dualisms they found in 
Kant) a surreptitious retention of the very transcendence that it seeks to escape from: 
those who speak endlessly of the King who has been executed still live under his reign, 
even if he is now a spectre. 
Two things have followed from this. First, Levinas would become no longer a 
figure in opposition to Derrida, but a comrade in spirit, as ethics seeped into post-
modernism/ post-structuralism when charges of nihilism became unbearable for a 
movement needing to demonstrate its political credibility and show that its 
Heideggerean roots were not to be equated with the poisonous fruits of Heidegger’s 
own fascist turn. Secondly, there were all manner of theological anticipations and 
affinities in the apophatic gesture of what seemed at first a nihilistic or purely secular 
philosophical gesture of defiance against the father (whatever that father was – the 
logos, the phallus, Hegel, Husserl, Reason, structuralism etc.). Mark C. Taylor in 
Erring: a Postmodern A/Theology, Kevin Hart in Trespass of the Sign, and Robert Magliola 
(a Carmelite lay Buddhist)  in Derrida on the Mend were amongst the first to ‘smell’ the 
theological implications of post-structuralism and post-modernism, though now post-
structuralist  theology is as common place as social theorists writing books on St. Paul.  
If we briefly contrast Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, on one side, with Karl 
Barth and post-structuralist a/theology we again see how the apophatic gesture of the 
post-structural is the gap that reintroduces the absolute alterity of transcendence. 
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Neither Rosenzweig nor Rosenstock-Huessy are apologists for, or appealing to God’s 
transcendence or His absolute alterity.27 Indeed this was precisely their antipathy 
toward Barth, an antipathy that compelled Rosenstock-Huessy, immediately having 
read Barth’s The Epistle to the Romans, to dash off a letter telling the unsuspecting (and 
very irritated) Barth precisely what was wrong with this way of representing God.28 For 
his part, Rosenzweig was equally non-plussed by Barth’s aphophatic alteritism: ‘After 
a long drought, today we have a theology, mostly protestant, that leaves nothing to be 
desired as to the accuracy. We have it now: that God is wholly other, that to talk about 
him is to talk Him away, that we cannot say what he does to us.’29 Rosenzweig would 
write to Buber of Barth’s ‘colossal negations’ leaving nothing but a whitewash 
wall...[of] indifferent authenticity.’ Why this negativity – were Rosenzweig and 
Rosenstock-Huessy not happy that God was again being spoken of after years in the 
wilderness since the pronouncement of his death? Note, that unlike some sociologists 
today, who are relieved after the widespread failure of the discipline to factor in the 
spiritual needs and symbols of people, they were not wishing to defer to the sacred as 
such. On the contrary they both held that people invariably look for some god or other 
to bow before – whether that God is sex, money, a leader, the nation, Reason etc.30 
We are the creature that sacralises; likewise, for them, idolatry is not the exceptional 
response of people to the plethora of forces that surround us, but the typical response. 
Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is at pains to point out how Jews and Christians were 
untypical in not just having one God, but in worshipping a God who renounced 
creation for redemption, the natural goods of life, not for ascetic or mystical reasons to 
have a mystical experience, nor to escape the wheel of life and death and suffering, but 
in order to participate with creation so that it becomes lovable beyond natural death. 
The first commandment of Yahweh – the proscription on worshipping other gods – is 
the Hebrew recognition of the ‘natural’ tendency, or temptation, to commit idolatry. 
Redemption, as Rosenzweig emphasizes, requires that a people say ‘No’ so that 
natural actions be reappraised in conformity to the commandment of love. Saying No 
and saying Yes, and knowing when to say which is a kind of switch in the chain of 
27 Note the references to Karl Barth by the self-consciously post-modern theologian Mark C. Taylor in 
After, God (Religion and Postmodernism) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) Chapter 5 passim.  
28 For further details see my ‘Rosenstock-Huessy’s Anti-Transcendent Critique of Karl Barth,’) in The 
Cross and the Star: The Post-Nietzschean Christian and Jewish Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz 
Rosenzweig, edited by Wayne Cristaudo and Frances Huessy (Cambridge: CSP, 2009), pp. 277-289. 
29 Franz Rosenzweig, and Jehuda Halevi, Translating, Translations, and Translators, translated by Barbara Galli, 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995), pp. 204-205 
30 See chapter 1, ‘Which Spirit to Serve: The Stirring of the Living, Loving God,’ in my Religion, Redemption 
and Revolution: The New Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012). 
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possible worlds. The God of Jews and Christians does indeed prefer the redeemed 
world over the original creation. And for speech thinkers, God’s commandments are 
commandments about how we relate to each other and to the world. 
Thus for both Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, Barth had missed the critical 
point of how the biblical God is implicated in the world-making of his people. This all-
important difference is overlooked in the one book length treatment of Barth and 
Rosenzweig by Randi Rashkover, Revelation and Theopolitics: Barth, Rosenzweig, and the 
Politics of Praise.31  But Rashkover’s reading of Rosenzweig is all too typical of the North 
American academic reading of Rosenzweig, and the consensuses upon which that 
reading takes place: ethics and politics are taken as the primary modalities within 
which Rosenzweig, indeed anyone important, should participate. That is to say, the 
consensus that dominates North American, and to a large extent all geo-academic 
‘regions’ which are shaped by prestigious North American universities and their 
university presses and conferences which spread the consensus, is that nothing could 
be more encompassing or important than ethics or politics or art (which is ostensibly 
the other two by another practice). The price paid for this emphasis and consensus 
when it comes to reading Rosenzweig is the diminution of the philosophical 
anthropological character that makes his work so unusual; for Rosenzweig dwells upon 
the far more elemental layers of world and people making than either ethics or politics 
– and, I will not address it here, but suffice it to say that his view of the highest art 
being religiously applied art is about as unfashionable a claim as it is possible to make, 
but he provides powerful reasons for this counter intuitive claim.32 
This is very closely related to a point so manifestly obvious in the Star yet 
insufficiently appreciated in most commentaries on it: it is precisely the triadic 
interplay of God -Man -World that is the all important interplay that distinguishes the 
Jewish and Christian orientations to life: the God of Jews and Christians is a loving 
God who wants to redeem His creation; He is driven by a deep need of love to love 
beyond His own Creation and to love along with his created. Concomitantly, 
Rosenzweig argues that the tragedy of the pagan life-world is precisely that these three 
‘poles’ or primordial names by which we orientate our existence are ever approached 
in isolation, that is in their alterity. That the apophatic reproduces this aspect of the 
pagan should not be surprising precisely because, although there are Jewish and 
Christian mystics who belong to the apophatic tradition, the tradition is one in which 
the same disjuncture that exists between speech and reality (and thus between Man 
31 Randi Rashkover, Revelation and Theopolitics: Barth, Rosenzweig, and the Politics of Praise (London: T and 
T.Clark, 2005). 
32 See chapter 11 ‘Beyond the Idol of Art, Part 1: Rosenzweig and the Role of Redemption in Art,’ in 
Religion, Redemption. Revolution.  
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and World) exists between God and Man.  The theology of Rosenzweig, and if I may 
(with some caution) use this term for Rosenstock-Huessy, is one which is emphatically 
anti-metaphysical in its traditional usage – The Star opens with a (resolutely non-
Platonist/non Aristotelian) metaphysical, meta-logical, and meta-ethical analysis to 
curtail Reason’s exaggerations – to put reason and its claims back into existence, not as 
immanent in a Hegelian sense but simply as an aspect within life. What comes out of 
this is the observation that the triadic relationship between God - Man - World, when 
understood as relationship, is but the basis of another triad – Creation, Revelation and 
Redemption. And it is this doubled triad that is the symbolic core of the Jewish people 
and, for Rosenzweig, this ‘shape’  ‘radiates’ upon their inimical Christian brothers and 
sisters who also are called to act by the same loving God of the living and the dead of 
revelation.   
If we turn briefly to post-structuralist theology for a moment we see that its 
connection with the apophatic is invariably due to the very semantic heritage of the 
neo-Platonic tradition (which we again recall has, at least in the West, a pride of place 
in the apophatic tradition). I think Mark C. Taylor’s work well illustrates the issue. In 
his early book Erring: A Post Modern A/Theology, Taylor states that ‘In the absence of 
transcendence, interiority and depth give way to a play of surfaces.’33 Erring is a paean 
to this play of surfaces and an enthusiastic call to embrace a theology without 
transcendence. Thirty years later, in a work weighed down by a firmer Barthian grip, 
we see that Taylor has agonized seemingly endlessly over a metaphysical dyad that 
should have long been abandoned were the liberation as fulfilling as it initially seemed. 
Soberly, stoically, he writes: ‘Transcendence whatever its guise can never be 
completely negated; immanentization always engenders transcendentalization, which 
in turn is sublated without being completely obliterated.’34  
As philosophically compact as Rosenzweig is, one will never find a sentence 
remotely comparable to this. We might put it this way – and this is definitely how 
Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy would see it – the entire formulation remains too 
steeped in the Greek tradition of thinking that is philosophy. And it is that tradition 
which creates the vocabulary, the names for dealing with the tragic reality of the 
collective encounter (and Rosenzweig does not deny the possibilities of personal 
encounters, let alone the reality of mystical encounters by all manner of pagans, but 
his brief is peoples not individuals) which does not articulate the doubled triadic 
33 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Post-Modern A/Theology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp.15-16. 
34 After God, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 393-394. For Barth’s presence see chapter 5 
passim.  
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interplay which he argued is but the grammatical thread that transpires between God’s 
word and His people.35  
   
Let us conclude this paper by reaffirming the importance of what we may express 
theologically – God’s presence in the world is a spoken presence. Let us bear in mind 
that this is not a metaphysical statement but a metaphorical one. All speech is 
metaphor, which is why unsaying is not ‘not saying’ but an understandable attempt at 
de-essentializing that takes place within a metaphysic, that I have suggested it does not 
sufficiently liberate itself from.  
Let us also add, by way of an affinity we share with the apophatic aspect of the 
post-structuralist theologian/social thinker, that the great danger with the elevation of 
the word is that speech becomes a substitute for action, that words become merely 
words, and that words rather than being the clearing and the spur, as well as the 
vehicle for the divine’s entrance into the world, become but the fuzz and blur that 
covers over and closes out the sacred character of creation. When words lose their 
sacred significance we are left with this one being who is so diabolical that the Other 
reality becomes ever more venerable. And being absolutely Other it becomes the 
nothingness onto which we project, the phantasmic which Feuerbach, Marx and 
Nietzsche, each in their own way, had seen as the curse that had closed humanity off 
from its possibilities and vitality. Words lose their sacred significance when the world 
itself has been so desacralized that what one wants from it no longer bears any 
resemblance to the sacredness of its source and the plenitude of its possibility – or, 
more prosaically, when it is not lovable. Mundane reality is, then, the reflection of the 
mundane spirit that is really the death of all spirit. It is brute power or routine action 
followed and activated by routine speech, it is utterly predictable, an endless burden 
and planned; it is diabolical (or if we prefer Freud’s formulation, a death drive) precisely 
because it is contrary to life as such; nothing doing nothing. ‘Why,’ asks Baudrillard 
perfectly expressing the symptom of a spiritually suicidal age, ‘is there nothing rather 
than something?’36  
The mundane that is absolutely mundane closes off the irruption by taking a past 
entrance into the real, a past and singular moment of creation, as the adequate action/ 
rule/idea to encompass reality – such encompassing is suffocation. Note that this is not 
to say that order is diabolical – we rightly speak of a ‘divine order’, and what is meant 
by that is a particular order the source of which impregnates the relationships that 
form a pattern. But divine order is always a living order, an order of living creatures 
35 See chapter 3 of my Religion, Redemption and Revolution.  
36 Jean Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime, translated by Chris Turner. (New York: Verso, 1996), p. 2. 
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and living relationships – relationships between each other and the source of that 
otherness and the power of concordance that is love itself. Moreover, we need pattern 
to have orientation, but when the divinity is absent from an order and order is all that 
remains – then the order is but a husk. Politically this is the problem with those types 
of conservative thinking which seek to protect or resurrect an order that no longer 
contains anything sacred. Idolatry always mistakes the created for the creator in its 
supplication and veneration (just as Milton’s Eve worships the tree of knowledge’ after 
succumbing to Satan’s temptation). Against the idolatry of the conservative is the 
idolatry of the radical whose utopian flight, as Franz Rosenzweig so perceptively 
argued in The Star of Redemption, bypasses the neighbour who is there to be loved for the 
not-yet of the abstract neighbour to come – thus does love, as abstract flight, become 
its antithesis because it is not embedded in or participating in the reality that is the 
basis and condition of our nurture. For such an act of flight must have real 
consequences – one is reminded of defenders of communism who would say 
communism was never really tried; thus does the abstraction remain truer than reality, 
which, of course, was one of the things that Marx violently opposed, and why he 
insisted he was not a utopian. And in spite of Eric Voegelin’s deep animosity to what 
he took to be Marx’s intellectual dishonesty, Voegelin is part of that same tradition as 
Marx and Nietzsche to the extent that his hostility to Gnosticism is not because of its 
failure to understand the need that is expressed so powerfully in the Book of Exodus, 
the escape from real enslavement, but the conflation of the world of earth and toil for 
that of the heavens that would have us be the angels of heaven when all our realities 
demand our attention here and now. And any real future must be built out of the 
potencies in the order we inhabit and the grace (the unknown and incalculable) that 
comes to us (not from us) to activate the unknown.  
What is true of loving action here is no less so of speech – for speech which is not 
alive is speech which maintains the reified world of the non-existent, or the 
phantasmic. It is the speech that depletes rather than replenishes – speech that serves 
death rather than creation. Such dead speech is truly instrumental – and it makes 
instruments of us as we all become instrumentally engaged so that there is no real 
engagement. Living speech warns us of the dangers of this and enjoins us to acts of 
solidarity where our solidarity is of the spirit and not merely a resource. That is why it 
is divine.  
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